Bank Governance, Legal Supervision, and Related-Party Transaction Risks
Bank Governance, Legal Supervision, and Related-Party Transaction Risks
narges hsanpoor1 sayed mehdy hosayni harandi2
1) Bachelor s Student in Accounting at Islamic Azad University, Najafabad Branch, Iran
2) Assistant Professor at Islamic Azad University, Najafabad Branch, Iran
IOI Code
:
ABKH-ABHFGE
Publication :
4th International Conference on Applied Researches in Humanities, Economics, Management & Accounting(icrhema.com)
Abstract :
English Abstract
Purpose: Banks, as key financial intermediaries, are capable of timely tracking transaction records. This study investigates the supervisory role of banks in mitigating the risks of related-party transactions (RPTs).
Methodology: Utilizing rich empirical evidence from Chinese listed firms over the period 2015 to 2024 (comprising 15,286 firm-year observations), this research employs regression models alongside a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD).
Findings: The results demonstrate that the effectiveness of bank governance significantly reduces RPT risks. This effect is even stronger in regions with weak legal systems, confirming a substitution effect between banks and formal institutions. Mediation tests further reveal that rigorous loan reviews and effective risk warnings serve as the primary channels through which banks exert their disciplinary influence.
Conclusion: This research offers novel insights into the role of bank risk management and legal institutions, highlighting banks as a crucial and valuable external governance mechanism, particularly in institutionally weak environments with poor legal systems.
Keywords : bank governance related party transaction risk legal supervision institutional theory