Regulatory Compliance and Strategic Secrecy in Multinational Corporations Under Secondary Sanctions: A Conceptual-Analytical Framework Based on Zero-Knowledge Proofs in Accounting and Financial Reporting
Regulatory Compliance and Strategic Secrecy in Multinational Corporations Under Secondary Sanctions: A Conceptual-Analytical Framework Based on Zero-Knowledge Proofs in Accounting and Financial Reporting
fatemehmoradi1 mahdimoemenitaheri2
1) PhD student in Accounting. Islamic Azad University. Central Tehran Branch. Iran. Tehran
2) Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management and Accounting, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran
IOI Code
:
ABKH-ABKAAA
Publication :
4th International Conference on Applied Researches in Humanities, Economics, Management & Accounting(icrhema.com)
Abstract :
Implementing Regulatory Compliance and Strategic Secrecy in Multinational Corporations Under Secondary Sanctions:
Providing a Conceptual-Analytical Framework Based on Zero-Knowledge Proofs in Accounting and Financial Reporting
Abstract
In today’s international business environment, multinational corporations are increasingly faced with two conflicting imperatives: on the one hand, the need for regulatory compliance with sanctions regimes, cross-border regulations, and anti-money laundering and know-your-customer requirements; and on the other, the need to maintain strategic secrecy in order to protect competitive advantage, sensitive business relationships, and confidential financial and operational information. This conflict is exacerbated in the context of secondary sanctions, as corporations not only have to prove their compliance, but also face the risk of inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information.
Based on a conceptual-analytical approach, this study examines the potential of zero-knowledge proofs as an innovative mechanism to balance verifiability and confidentiality. In this framework, an organization can prove statements such as compliance with sanctions restrictions, compliance of transactions with counterparty policies, and compliance with governance rules without disclosing raw data. Drawing on the theories of agency, transaction cost, signaling, legitimacy, and data governance, this paper demonstrates that it can, as a cryptographic-accounting tool, reduce information asymmetry, improve audit quality, and limit the risk of sensitive information disclosure. Finally, a cost-benefit decision-making model and research roadmap for future studies are presented. Keywords: secondary sanctions, multinational corporations, strategic confidentiality, regulatory compliance, zero-knowledge proofs, international accounting, financial reporting, auditing.
Keywords : secondary sanctions multinational corporations strategic secrecy regulatory compliance zero knowledge proof international accounting financial reporting auditing