The State as the Hidden Subsidy: Reframing Iran s Political Economy Problem from a Governance Perspective

The State as the Hidden Subsidy: Reframing Iran s Political Economy Problem from a Governance Perspective

Mehdi Mahdavian Sadr1

1) PhD in Public Administration (Comparative Management and Development), Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran. E-mail:

IOI Code : ABKH-ABHGFH
Publication : 4th International Conference on Applied Researches in Humanities, Economics, Management & Accounting(icrhema.com)
Abstract :
    For at least five decades, Iran s economy has grappled with a set of chronic afflictions: persistent double-digit inflation, structural fiscal imbalance, low productivity, and a bloated public sector that neither shrinks nor becomes efficient. Over these years nearly every conventional policy and its opposite has been tried: single- and multiple-rate exchange regimes, in-kind and cash subsidies, price control and liberalization, nationalization and privatization. Yet the framing of the problem has not changed, and the difficulties resurface each time from a different quarter. This article argues that the prevailing explanations of this chronic inefficiency — sanctions, corruption, and subsidy policy — each describe a part of reality but all mistake the symptom for the cause. Drawing on historical institutionalism and on the literatures of neopatrimonialism, the rentier state, and limited access orders, the article s central claim is that what is called the state in Iran is at bottom not an organization for administering public affairs in the modern sense, but a historically rooted mechanism for distributing rent, opportunity, and wealth among circles connected to power, one that has merely borrowed the shell and form of the modern state. From this vantage, what Iranian economic discourse labels hidden subsidies (preferential currency, cheap energy, subsidized bread and water) are in fact entirely overt; the genuinely hidden subsidy is the state itself: a system of discriminatory access to licenses, credit, appointments, land, and preferential passage through regulation, in which each person s share is a function of proximity to the core of power. By tracing this pattern across three periods free of sanctions or with light sanctions — the 1970s, the post-JCPOA interval, and their comparison with the maximum-pressure era — the article shows that the constant variable behind inefficiency is this distributive structure, and it explains in closing why conventional programs of downsizing and efficiency are self-defeating within this structure and why a legislative and oversight response to the problem requires redefining the state itself.

Keywords : governance the state in iran hidden subsidy rent neopatrimonialism limited access orders