Examining the Relationship Between Tax Avoidance and Firm Value: The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance
Examining the Relationship Between Tax Avoidance and Firm Value: The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance
Fatemeh Lotfiyan1
1) Master s in Accounting, University of Kurdistan
IOI Code
:
ABKH-ABKEBC
Publication :
4th International Conference on Applied Researches in Humanities, Economics, Management & Accounting(icrhema.com)
Abstract :
Background: The prior literature has reported heterogeneous findings on the effect of corporate tax avoidance on firm value; some studies have documented a positive relationship and others a negative one. This inconsistency has been attributed, in part, to differences in corporate governance structures across the markets examined, and in part to the assumption of linearity adopted in most earlier studies. The present study was conducted to examine the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value, incorporating the moderating role of corporate governance and directly testing the nonlinearity of this relationship.
Method: This study employed a descriptive-correlational causal design using panel data from 148 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2016 to 2024 (equivalent to 1,121 firm-year observations). Firm value was approximated by Tobin’s Q, and tax avoidance was measured by the effective tax rate, the cash effective tax rate, and the book–tax gap. Corporate governance was entered into the model as a composite index of the proportion of non-executive directors, institutional ownership concentration, and audit committee independence. The baseline model was estimated using fixed-effects panel regression (following the Hausman test) with standard errors clustered at the firm level; to safeguard the findings against potential endogeneity, the system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator was also employed.
Findings: The effective tax rate exhibited a negative and statistically significant relationship with Tobin’s Q (β = −0.842, p < 0.001), and this relationship remained robust after adding the interaction term with the corporate governance index (β = 0.912, p = 0.024) and in the system GMM estimation (β = −0.658, p = 0.006). The relationship between the book–tax gap and Tobin’s Q followed a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped pattern (linear term: β = 3.14, p = 0.002; quadratic term: β = −18.6, p = 0.004), with a turning point at 0.084.
Conclusion: The findings indicate that tax avoidance bears a conditional and nonlinear relationship with firm value; this relationship is positive up to a certain threshold and turns negative beyond it, with its intensity moderated by the quality of corporate governance. This pattern is consistent with an interpretation based on the trade-off between cash-flow benefits and the agency costs arising from tax avoidance, and it suggests that the risk assessment of tax avoidance should not be undertaken independently of the firm’s governance structure.
Keywords : tax avoidance firm value corporate governance tobin s kiwi panel data