Criteria and Mechanisms for Optimal Economic Risk Allocation in Construction Contracts

Criteria and Mechanisms for Optimal Economic Risk Allocation in Construction Contracts

Azim Hoseini1 Majid Sabouri2

1) Professor at Islamic Azad University, South Tehran Branch
2) Ph.D. Student in Construction Management, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran Branch

IOI Code : ACDK-ACZAEK
Publication : 4th International Conference Civil Engineering, Architecture and Urban Planning(4cau.ir)
Abstract :
    Construction projects are exposed to a wide range of contractual risks due to their long execution periods, the involvement of multiple stakeholders, and their dependence on economic conditions. Among these, economic risks, including inflation and increases in input prices, exchange rate fluctuations, changes in financing costs, and delays in payment of receivables, can affect the economic balance of contracts and, ultimately, the continuity of project execution. The fundamental issue is that an inappropriate allocation of these risks between the employer and the contractor may lead to higher bid prices, the emergence of contractual disputes, reduced contractor liquidity, delays in project execution, and even project suspension. The present study aims to identify, review, and analyze previous studies on the criteria and mechanisms affecting the optimal allocation of economic risks in construction contracts. In this study, by reviewing and analyzing previous studies and examining relevant frameworks and sources related to contractual risk management and allocation, the main risk allocation criteria, including controllability, predictability, measurability, impact severity, risk-bearing capacity, and risk transfer cost, were identified and analyzed. Subsequently, the application of these criteria to the management of economic risks in construction contracts was examined, with emphasis on inflation risk, contracts with and without price adjustment provisions, exchange rate fluctuations, and payment delays. The results indicate that optimal risk allocation should not be limited to determining the party initially responsible for a risk; rather, it should be accompanied by mechanisms for measurement, activation thresholds, compensation, and contractual readjustment. Accordingly, a proposed framework is presented in which risks are initially allocated between the parties based on their characteristics, and, if the resulting economic impacts exceed normal limits, mechanisms for risk reallocation and contractual readjustment are activated. The proposed framework can provide a basis for designing particular conditions of construction contracts and enhancing the flexibility and efficiency of construction contracts in volatile economic environments.

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